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Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador

UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador, Report, 15 March 1993, in UN Secretary General, Letter to the President of the Security Council (S/25500), Annex. (PDF link)


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(f) Las Hojas (1983)

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(h) Attack on an FMLN hospital and execution of a nurse (1989)


(g) SAN SEBASTIAN

SUMMARY OF THE CASE

On 21 September 1988, members of the Jiboa Battalion detained 10 people in San Francisco canton in the district of San Sebastián. That same morning, Major Mauricio Jesús Beltrán Granados, chief of the Intelligence Department of the Fifth Brigade, under orders from Colonel José Emilio Chávez Cáceres, Chief of the Fifth Brigade, arrived at San Francisco canton. After interrogating several of the detainees, he ordered all 10 of them executed and the staging of a fictitious ambush.

In March 1989, an Honour Commission of the armed forces conducted an investigation in which members of the Jiboa Battalion said that Major Beltrán Granados had ordered them to execute the detainees and cover up the incident. Beltrán Granados, another officer and other non-commissioned officers and soldiers were brought before the judge, who ordered their detention. They were then released, except for Beltrán who is awaiting judgement.

The Commission on the Truth finds the following:

1. Colonel José Emilio Chávez Cáceres gave the order to execute the detainees.

2. Major Mauricio de Jesús Beltrán Granados ordered members of the Jiboa Battalion to execute the 10 detained peasants.

3. Colonel José Emilio Chávez Cáceres covered up the execution of the 10 detainees and Major Mauricio de Jesús Beltrán Granados took steps to cover up the execution.

4. Second Lieutenant Arnoldo Antonio Vásquez Alvarenga transmitted Major Beltrán’s order to designate some soldiers to finish off the victims and also provided the necessary materials to activate the mines which seriously wounded them.

5. Sergeant Jorge Alberto Tobar Guzmán activated the mechanism that detonated the mines, knowing that they would explode in the place where the detained peasants were.

6. Deputy Sergeant Rafael Rosales Villalobos and soldiers Fermín Cruz Castro, José Carlos Hernández Matute, José Alfredo Méndez Beltrán and Francisco Ponce Ramírez shot and killed the detainees.

7. Colonel Luis Mariano Turcios and Lieutenant Colonel José Antonio Rodríguez Molina knew about the order to execute the detainees and did nothing to prevent their execution.

8. The Honour Commission of the armed forces, the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts and the judge of the Criminal Court of First Instance of the city of San Sebastián failed to take steps to determine the responsibility of Colonel José Emilio Chávez Cáceres, Colonel Luis Mariano Turcios and Lieutenant Colonel José Antonio Rodríguez Molina.

DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS 245/

The executions

On 20 September 1988, the second company of the Jiboa battalion of the Fifth Brigade arrived in the municipality of San Sebastián in the Department of San Vicente. Lieutenant Manuel de Jesús Gálvez Gálvez, commander of the unit, was informed that four men were involved in subversive activities. He ordered Second Lieutenant Arnoldo Antonio Vásquez Alvarenga to go to San Francisco canton and detain them.

Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga detained one of these men that same night. The detainee took the soldiers to a place where they found subversive propaganda, explosive devices, rucksacks, wire and two M-16 rifles. 246/

Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga informed Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez of the find. 247/ Captain Oscar Armando Peña Durán heard the information on the radio and transmitted it to the Fifth Brigade. Early next morning, over the Cerro Las Delicias radio relay station, Captain Peña Durán was ordered to "eliminate" the detainee. Captain Peña Durán said that his officers (Gálvez and Vásquez) could not obey that order. He then informed Gálvez Gálvez of the order, and the latter also refused to carry it out. Gálvez told him that if the order was repeated, the Brigade should be requested to give the order in writing.

During the night, Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga continued to interrogate the detainee and the latter agreed to point out the house of the other three suspects. 248/ All of them were subsequently detained.

The four detainees were taken to the village school. Second Lieutenant Vásquez received a message over the radio from Lieutenant Gálvez informing him that he would come to San Francisco canton and telling him to assemble the residents of the canton in the school. 249/

At 7.30 a.m. on 21 December, Lieutenant Gálvez arrived and interrogated one of the detainees again. 250/ He again contacted Captain Peña and told him that he would not kill the detainees without a written order from the Commander of the Brigade. 251/ The Commander of the Fifth Brigade, and of the Fifth Military Zone, was Colonel José Emilio Chávez Cáceres. Peña requested permission to go to the Brigade and explain the situation in San Francisco. Major Beltrán Granados refused permission. 252/ He added that he would go to San Francisco canton with two interrogators. Peña Durán then contacted Gálvez Gálvez to inform him that Major Beltrán was coming, and told him to make a report to him. 253/

On the morning of 21 September, under orders from Colonel Chávez Cáceres, Major Beltrán went to San Francisco canton. He arrived the same morning, with two other interrogators and his assistant.

Captain Peña Durán, for his part, arrived at the Brigade 254/ at midday. He reported to Major Rodríguez, informing him of what had happened and of the order to eliminate the detainee. According to Captain Peña, Major Rodríguez said that the detainee should be taken to Brigade headquarters, in accordance with the procedure for normal operations. The two of them informed Lieutenant Colonel Turcios of the situation and of the order to eliminate the detainee. Peña then gave the same report to Colonel Chávez Cáceres. According to Chávez Cáceres, he told Peña that the detainee should be transferred to the Brigade. 255/

When Major Beltrán Granados arrived in the canton, Gálvez Gálvez made a report to him. 256/ Beltrán had three detainees brought out for interrogation. On his return from the interrogation, Major Beltrán, who as intelligence officer was not in command of the unit, informed Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez that they had to execute the detainees. Gálvez Gálvez replied that he would not obey that order and that he would hand over command of the unit that was carrying out the operation to Major Beltrán. 257/

Beltrán Granados told Gálvez to order the detention of other persons, which he did. The total number of detainees increased to 10. 258/ Then, according to testimony, Major Beltrán Granados gave the order to execute them by simulating a guerrilla ambush. 259/

Major Beltrán Granados ordered Sergeant Tobar Guzmán to look for a place down in the street in which to lay the confiscated mines to prepare an ambush. 260/ Tobar laid the mines and connected the wire to them. 261/

Second Lieutenant Vásquez ordered the soldiers to take the rest of the confiscated material to the site of the ambush. Second Lieutenant Vásquez told soldiers "Churute" (Fermín Cruz Castro), Matute (José Carlos Hernández Matute) and "Ciguanabo" (José Alfredo Méndez Beltrán) that they would finish off any detainee who was left alive. 262/

The detainees’ hands were tied behind their backs (except for the women) and they were blindfolded. At about 3 p.m., they were taken to the place where they were to be executed, on the road. Vásquez gave a battery to Tobar, who installed it and activated the mines. 263/

Some soldiers shot off their weapons to simulate an ambush, as ordered by Major Beltrán. 264/ The gunfire lasted five minutes. Since the detainees did not die as a result of the mines, Major Beltrán ordered some soldiers to finish them off. One of them, Manuel de Jesús Herrera Rivera, refused to obey the order. Soldiers "Churute" (Fermín Cruz Castro), "Balazo" (Francisco Ponce Ramírez) and Matute (José Carlos Hernández Matute) finished off the detainees. 265/

Major Beltrán Granados ordered Deputy Sergeant Rosales Villalobos to shoot the detainees, and he did so. He also ordered a soldier to take the blindfolds off the bodies and ordered soldier Hernández Alfaro to smear blood on the uniform of soldier Méndez Beltrán ("Ciguanabo") and put a dressing on him to make it look as if he had been wounded in combat.

Major Beltrán then ordered Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez to inform the Brigade that terrorists had ambushed them and that eight detainees and two terrorists had been killed, and to request a helicopter to transport a wounded soldier. 266/

A helicopter arrived with a lawyer from Department 5 of the Brigade and a United States adviser. Beltrán got into the helicopter with the allegedly wounded soldier and they went to Brigade headquarters.

The cover-up and the official investigations

The next day, the San Sebastián justice of the peace identified the murdered peasants and COPREFA reported that 10 subversives had died in a clash between troops of the Jiboa Battalion and guerrillas. On 23 September, COPREFA published the version that Colonel Chávez Cáceres says he received from Major Beltrán Granados.

Officials from non-governmental human rights bodies (Legal Protection and the non-governmental Human Rights Commission) and journalists went to San Francisco canton on 22 September. A number of witnesses reported that the peasants had been murdered by the soldiers. In public statements, President Duarte refuted the accusations.

General Blandón, Chief of Staff, communicated with Colonel Chávez Cáceres on 23 September and told him that the version of the incident he had been given was untrue.

On 24 September, Major Beltrán Granados learnt that a soldier called Escoto had been wounded by guerrillas. He suggested to Escoto that he pretend to have been wounded at San Francisco on 21 September, so as to help them find a way out of the problem. Two days later, he presented him to the other members of the second section of the second company of the Jiboa Battalion and told them that they should say that Escoto had been at San Francisco on 21 September and that he had been wounded there. Escoto was then presented as having been at San Francisco that day. 267/

On the night of 26 September, Major Beltrán Granados assembled the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who had been at San Francisco. He indicated the places where each of them had been when they left San Francisco canton and said that was the version they should give. Later, there were other meetings to remind the soldiers what they had to say. On one occasion, Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga took the soldiers to San Francisco canton and placed each soldier in the position that had been indicated to him, so that each soldier would recognize his position and not forget what he had to say.

On 27 and 28 September, members of the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts interviewed Major Beltrán, Lieutenant Gálvez, Second Lieutenant Vásquez and the non-commissioned officers and soldiers. They all adhered to the cover-up version.

Some days later, lawyers Paredes and Parker of the Ministry of Defence and of the General Staff, respectively, interrogated the personnel of the Fifth Brigade who had been in San Francisco canton. All of them kept to the version of an ambush. An investigator administered lie detector tests. The results showed that some people were giving "dubious" replies. The lawyers then drew up a report which Chávez Cáceres sent to the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence.

Nine days after the incident, a member of the Jiboa Battalion told Colonel Chávez Cáceres that Major Beltrán had ordered the execution of the detainees and that they had been murdered. On 5 October, the corpses were exhumed and the forensic analysis revealed that the peasants had died after being shot at close range and not during combat. 268/

On 29 October 1988, the Commander of the Fifth Brigade announced at a press conference that the detainees had died in an ambush and that the guerrillas had returned during the night and mutilated the bodies to make it look as if they had been executed at close range.

Between 8 and 10 December 1988, investigators from the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts again interrogated the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. All of them kept to the cover-up version.

On 3 February 1989, United States Vice-President Dan Quayle visited El Salvador and called for the punishment of those responsible for the San Sebastián massacre. He handed over a list of three officers who were implicated: Colonel Chávez Cáceres, Major Beltrán Granados and Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga.

Some days later, Colonel Chávez Cáceres left the Brigade and Lieutenant Colonel Turcios was put in command. The other officers were then relieved of their duties. Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez was held at Treasury Police headquarters, along with Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga.

In the course of February and March 1989, the military personnel who had been in San Francisco canton were questioned again. With the exception of Major Beltrán Granados, all of them abandoned the version of an ambush and said that Major Beltrán had ordered the execution and also the cover-up version of the incident.

The Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts identified Major Beltrán Granados as having ordered the executions and Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga, Sergeant Tobar Guzmán, Deputy Sergeant Rosales Villalobos, Corporal Ayala Arias and soldiers Cruz Castro, Hernández Matute, Mendéz Beltrán and Ponce Ramírez as having been responsible for carrying them out. 269/

Colonel Chávez Cáceres was not summonsed to make a statement or accused of or held responsible for any act or omission.

The judicial proceedings

The results of the investigations were sent to the judge of the Court of First Instance of San Sebastián on 11 March 1989. 270/ The judicial detention of nine people was ordered. 271/ In February 1990, the judge released all of them except Major Beltrán 272/ and Deputy Sergeant Rosales Villalobos. 273/

In May 1990, the court of San Vicente confirmed the judgement ordering the detainees’ release and revoked the decision to bring Deputy Sergeant Rafael Rosales Villalobos to trial. 274/

As of the date of drafting of this report, Major Beltrán was still in prison awaiting the public hearing.

FINDINGS

The Commission finds the following:

1. There is sufficient evidence that Colonel José Emilio Chávez Cáceres gave the order to execute the detainees.

2. There is full evidence that Major Mauricio de Jesús Beltrán Granados ordered members of the Jiboa Battalion to execute the 10 detained peasants.

3. There is substantial evidence that Colonel José Emilio Chávez Cáceres covered up the execution of the 10 detainees, and full evidence that Major Mauricio de Jesús Beltrán Granados took steps to cover up the execution.

4. There is substantial evidence that Second Lieutenant Arnoldo Antonio Vásquez Alvarenga transmitted the order from Major Beltrán Granados to designate some soldiers to finish off the victims and sufficient evidence that he provided the necessary materials to activate the mines which seriously wounded the victims.

5. There is substantial evidence that Sergeant Jorge Alberto Tobar Guzmán activated the mechanism that detonated the mines, knowing that they would explode in the place where the detained peasants were.

6. There is substantial evidence that Deputy Sergeant Rafael Rosales Villalobos and soldiers Fermín Cruz Castro, José Carlos Hernández Matute, José Alfredo Méndez Beltrán and Francisco Ponce Ramírez shot and killed the detainees.

7. There is sufficient evidence that Colonel Luis Mariano Turcios and Lieutenant Colonel José Antonio Rodríguez Molina knew about the order to execute the detainees and did nothing to prevent their execution.

8. There is substantial evidence that the Honour Commission of the armed forces, the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts and the judge of the Criminal Court of First Instance of the city of San Sebastián failed to take steps to determine the responsibility of Colonel José Emilio Chávez Cáceres, Colonel Luis Mariano Turcios and Lieutenant Colonel José Antonio Rodríguez Molina.

NOTES:

245/ The Commission reviewed the complaints submitted by Americas Watch, the Archdiocesan Legal Protection Office and the non-governmental Human Rights Commission, the dossier of the criminal case and the report of the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts. It also received information from diplomatic sources and from witnesses.

The Commission asked Colonel René Arnoldo Majano for official information on the activities of the Fifth Brigade on the date of the incident, in particular the name of the officer who was acting as Chief of Service. There was no response to this request for information.

246/ Statement by Second Lieutenant Arnoldo Vásquez Alvarenga and Deputy Sergeant Hernán Ayala Arias, at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security of the Ministry of Defence.

247/ Statement by Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez and Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

248/ Statement by Deputy Sergeant Hernán Ayala Arias and Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

249/ Statement by Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

250/ Statement by Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

251/ Statement by Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

252/ Statement by Captain Peña Durán and Major Beltrán Granados at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security. The latter said that he refused permission because he had to consult the commanding officers to see what they felt about that possibility. Beltrán also said that Peña had informed him that units of the Jiboa Battalion had arrested several people and confiscated subversive material, and that he had added that the arrests had been witnessed by the villagers and that the previous night he had been ordered to eliminate the detainees.

253/ Statement by Captain Peña and Lieutenant Gálvez at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

254/ In his statement at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security, Captain Peña Durán said that he had contacted the Brigade a second time and had spoken with then Major Rodríguez Molina, requesting and receiving his permission to go to Brigade headquarters.

255/ Captain Peña said in his statement at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security that he had spoken to the officers mentioned above in the order indicated. However, in the statement taken from him on this occasion, it was noted only that he had reported "on the situation" in San Francisco canton but not on the existence of the order to execute the detainee. When he testified before the Commission on the Truth, Captain Peña Durán said that he had expressly informed Rodríguez Molina, Turcios and Chávez Cáceres of the existence of the order. However, he said that when he informed Chávez, the latter simultaneously received the report that the detainees had died in an ambush. Colonel Chávez Cáceres said in his statement to the Commission on the Truth that Captain Peña had only informed him of the general situation in San Francisco canton. Colonel Turcios said that Captain Peña had reported to Major Rodríguez Molina, who had gone to the office of Lieutenant Colonel Turcios. They had then both gone to report to Colonel Chávez Cáceres. He does not recall having received as part of Peña’s report the information that the detainee was going to be executed.

256/ Statement by Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

257/ Statements by Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez, Reynaldo Aguilar Hernández and Oscar Cerón Sánchez at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security. Cerón Sánchez said that he heard Corporal Hernán Ayala Arias say that Lieutenant Gálvez had handed over command to Major Beltrán so as not to have problems with his soldiers. Corporal Ayala Arias did not refer to this fact.

258/ They were, including the four persons detained earlier, the following: José Félix Alfaro, Jesús Zepeda Rivas, María Zoila Rivas, Nicolás Flóres Alfaro, José Ulises Sibrián Rivas, Teresa de Jesús Argueta, José María Flóres, José Atilio Rivas, María de Jesús Sibrián and José Francisco Alfaro.

259/ Statement by Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

260/ Statements by Second Lieutenant Vásquez Alvarenga and Francisco Monzón Solis at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

On 6 March, at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security, Silverio Menjívar García said that Sergeant Tobar Guzmán had told him and other soldiers that "Major Beltrán had ordered him to lay the mines in order to kill the detainees".

261/ Statement by Sergeant Tobar at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

262/ Statement by private Manuel de Jesús Herrera Rivera at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security. In his judicial statement, Hernández Matute also said that Vásquez had designated Churute (Cruz Castro), Beltrán and himself to finish off the detainees. In his statement in the offices of the Vice-Ministry, Cruz Castro said that Vásquez designated him, (Méndez) Beltrán and (Hernández) Matute to finish off the detainees.

263/ Statement by Sergeant Jorge Alberto Tobar Guzmán and Napoleón Antonio Merino at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security of the Ministry of Defence, on 3 and 6 March 1989 respectively, and statement by Manuel de Jesús Herrera at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

264/ Statement by Francisco de Jesús Monzón Solís at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security. Judicial statement by Francisco Ponce Ramírez. Sergeant Tobar said in the same offices that a soldier had told him that the officers had ordered them to shoot after the mines were detonated, but not more than one round. Second Lieutenant Vásquez said that Major Beltrán ordered the soldiers to shoot to simulate an ambush.

265/ Statements by Manuel de Jesús Herrera Rivera, Napoleón Merino Martínez, Fermín Cruz Castro and Santos Victorino Díaz at the offices of the Vice-Ministry of Public Security. The first of these said that he saw Cruz Castro, Ponce Ramírez and Hernández Matute. The second said that he saw Cruz Castro, Ponce Ramírez, Hernández Matute and Méndez Beltrán. In his statement, Fermín Cruz Castro mentioned himself, Hernández Matute and Méndez Beltrán. Santos Victorino Díaz said that he saw soldiers "Churute" (Cruz Castro), "Ciguanabo" (Méndez Beltrán), "Chico Balazo" (Ponce Ramírez), Matute (Hernández Matute) and Corporal Ayala Arias shot the wounded detainees.

266/ Statement by Lieutenant Gálvez Gálvez.

267/ Statement by Lucio de Jesús Escoto Córdova at the offices of the Vice- Ministry of Public Security. After 3 March 1989, a document sent by the Fifth Brigade, based in San Vicente, listing the names of personnel in active service who had been in San Francisco canton, was added to the dossier of the court case. The name of Escoto Córdova was on the list (cf. folio 826).

268/ Folios 53 et seq. of the dossier.

269/ Report of the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts.

270/ Ff. 867 and 966 of the dossier of the court case on the San Francisco massacre. He was also told that the accused were in custody at his disposal in the Vice-Ministry of Public Security.

271/ Sixth document, f. 1180 of the dossier.

272/ On 26 June 1990, the Supreme Court approved a motion by the Attorney General to transfer the case against Major Beltrán from the San Vicente court to the Sixth Criminal Court in San Salvador. Seventh document, f. 1326 of the dossier.

273/ Seventh document, f. 1243 of the dossier.

274/ Seventh document, f. 1284 of the dossier.