UN Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador, Report, 15 March 1993, in UN Secretary General, Letter to the President of the Security Council (S/25500), Annex. (PDF link)
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SUMMARY OF THE CASE
On 27 November 1980, Enrique Alvarez Córdoba, 133/ Juan Chacón, 134/ Enrique Escobar Barrera, 135/ Manuel de Jesús Franco Ramírez, 136/ Humberto Mendoza 137/ and Doroteo Hernández, 138/ political leaders of the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR), 139/ representing an important sector of Salvadorian society, were abducted, tortured and, after a short period in captivity, executed in San Salvador.
The abduction was carried out during the morning at the Colegio San José by a large number of heavily armed men.
The climate of violence and insecurity prevailing in the country at the time was such that, had it not been for who the victims were, the place and time of the abduction, the type of operation and the public outrage it caused, it would have been just one more in the long list of abuses that were occurring at the time.
The Commission on the Truth concludes that it was an operation carried out by one or more public security forces and that the Treasury Police were responsible for the external security operation which aided and abetted the perpetrators. By commission and, in failing to properly investigate the incident, by omission, the State failed to comply with its obligations under international human rights law to protect and guarantee the enjoyment by individuals of their most elementary rights.
DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT
The six victims were abducted from the Colegio San José, a Jesuit School Society in the very heart of the capital city, San Salvador, between 9.30 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 27 November 1980. In the immediate vicinity of the school, there are other educational centres, a number of hospitals and, to the north, the former United States Embassy, which at the time was under heavy guard.
The ground floor of the central building housed the rector’s office, the administration and the Christian Legal Aid office, which had been in existence since 1975 when the school had started working with the neediest social sectors.
The workload of Christian Legal Aid had increased appreciably because, in addition to the normal stream of people coming to seek assistance, other entities which had been doing the same kind of work had closed their doors because of the prevailing climate of terror. 140/
Despite the large numbers of people going in and out of the school, the building had no security system. There were just a few unarmed porters at the central entrance to the educational complex. That morning there was only one porter at the main entrance.
The facts
The operation was carried out between 9.30 a.m. and 11 a.m. Initially, an unspecified number of men seized the porter, took him some 500 metres from the entrance and radioed to other people that they could go in.
They opened the gate and let in a number of vehicles carrying people who were heavily armed with machine-guns and "G3" rifles. 141/ The group went swiftly over to the central entrance of the main building and placed people against the wall ordering them to lie on the ground and close their eyes. Members of the group also stationed themselves at the entrances to the school and dealt in similar fashion with anyone who approached. Reports at the time put the total number of men who participated in the operation at between 13 and 200. 142/ According to the information received, the speed with which the bodies were dumped in the street in full view of passers-by was clearly intended to ensure that they were readily identified, so as to lessen the political pressure on the case.
The first four bodies and that of Alvarez Córdoba were found on the outskirts of the resort city of Apulo, in Ilopango district, approximately one hour by car from San Salvador. The Ilopango justice of the peace made the legal examination and opened a dossier which was later sent to the Fourth Criminal Court in San Salvador.
The Commission did not find that any judicial, police or administrative remedy had been sought to preserve the physical integrity of the abducted men. In its view, this was because people were very afraid and distrustful of using judicial bodies.
The Court dossier which the Commission studied shows clearly that the organ entrusted with investigating the case did not conduct a proper investigation; it finally closed the case on 8 October 1982. In fact, only bureaucratic measures were taken; no autopsy was performed, nor was anything else done to clarify the facts and find out who was responsible. 143/
ANALYSIS
Once the news broke, a war of communiqués ensued over who had committed the deed, whether part of the security forces or else the death squads acting without the direct participation of government forces. The possibility of it being the work of left-wing groups was also considered. 144/ The government Junta, for its part, urged that the physical and psychological integrity of the abducted leaders be respected. 145/
At the political level, the abduction of the opposition leaders closed the door to negotiations and fuelled demands for armed confrontation against the third Revolutionary Government Junta. It is worth recalling that the very day the incident occurred, the former Foreign Minister, Fidel Chávez Mena, was in Washington, D.C. at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), talking with church and opposition circles in an effort to secure a negotiated outcome to the crisis. 146/
The Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG) offered to carry out an exhaustive investigation into the incident and emphatically denied that security forces under its command had participated. The investigations that were carried out were purely a formality. For example, although a considerable number of people had been present when the incident took place, only four of them were interviewed. The Commission requested, but was not given, the report of the National Police. 147/
The incident outraged public opinion, prompting the armed forces and the Office of the President to interview some of the eyewitnesses. All political sectors in the country disclaimed responsibility for the incident, accusing other sectors.
FDR turned the funeral into a political rally, introducing the organization’s new leadership and asserting that paramilitary groups, with the complicity at least of the security forces, were responsible for the murders. 148/
From all the evidence which the Commission has gathered, it is clear that the purpose of the operation was to arrest the FDR leaders. It does not seem possible that the operation and its outcome could have occurred by chance or that it could have had any other purpose. The manner in which those participating in the operation entered the building and the surrounding area leaves no doubt that it was, indeed, an operation designed specifically to capture the leaders.
According to the various theories that have been put forward, the operation was carried out by paramilitary groups, by security forces or by a combination of the two; it may also have been an independent operation by members of those State organs.
For example, the Brigada Anticomunista General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez claimed responsibility for the murders. This group has been identified as one of several which the extreme right-wing used to claim responsibility for such actions. One witness told the Commission that, at the time the incident occurred, some soldiers in active service were members of the Brigade.
In the Commission’s view, the characteristics of the operation show that, while there may not have been unified planning by some security forces, the coverage provided for the execution of the crime was centralized and, without it, the operation would have been highly risky or very difficult to carry out. In any event, it is unlikely that the operation could have been carried out so openly without at least the complicity of the security forces which, moreover, were keeping a close watch on the political leaders and on the school itself because of the activities that were going on there.
Indeed, the time, the place, the number of personnel, the radio equipment, vehicles, weapons and uniforms used, the slang and the chain of command, the fact that the participants withdrew without any problem and the absence of a proper investigation by the security forces indicate the extent to which those forces were involved.
According to diplomatic reports, it was widely believed that the crime had been committed by security forces including, possibly, the Treasury Police. The testimony given by several people points in this direction. The Commission has substantial evidence that the Treasury Police carried out the security operation on the school’s perimeter. The Commission summonsed several officers who held positions of responsibility at the time in that institution. The few who did appear roundly denied having had anything to do with the incident.
Other information received by the Commission concerning the activities of the security and intelligence forces indicates that the National Guard carried out the operation, acting independently of the General Staff.
As indicated earlier, the Commission cannot, in any case, accept the idea that the operation was carried out without the cooperation of senior commanders of one or more security forces, which at the time were headed by military officers.
Based on the available information, it is difficult to determine whether the operation was planned at the highest level of the armed forces or whether, instead, it was instigated by middle-ranking commanders of the security forces, resulting in de facto situations that were difficult to reverse.
Lastly, the Commission tried in vain to establish who gave the order to kill the FDR leaders and whether that was part of the original plan or was decided upon subsequently. Given the conditions of violence prevailing at the time, an operation of this kind clearly involved a very high risk that the persons captured would be eliminated.
The Commission received reliable information that the final execution order was discussed at the highest level of right-wing sectors. It is alleged that there were telephone calls between those who carried out the murders and those who planned them. According to the testimony received, the latter allegedly decided to act as swiftly as possible in order to reduce the political pressure created by the capture of the victims.
FINDINGS
The Commission finds that:
1. The abduction, torture and subsequent murder of the political and trade union leaders was an act that outraged national and international public opinion and closed the door to any possibility of a negotiated solution to the political crisis at the end of 1980. It was a very serious act which warranted the most thorough investigation by the Commission on the Truth.
2. It is not possible to determine precisely which public security force carried out these criminal operations. Nevertheless, the Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that State bodies were jointly responsible for this incident, which violated international human rights law.
3. The Commission has substantial evidence that the Treasury Police carried out the external security operation which aided and abetted those who committed the murders.
4. There has been an obvious lack of interest in ordering an exhaustive investigation by an independent State organ to clarify the facts, find out who was responsible and bring those responsible to justice.
NOTES:
133/ Enrique Alvarez Córdoba, former Minister of Agriculture and Livestock and President of the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR). There were two bullet holes in his body. El Diario de Hoy, 29 November 1980.
134/ Juan Chácon, age 28, General Secretary of the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR). There were three bullet holes in his body, one in the ear, another in the forehead and one in the thorax, and signs of strangulation. F. 7, court dossier No. 600, Fourth Criminal Court of San Salvador.
135/ Enrique Escobar Barrera, age 35, a member of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR). There were two bullet holes in his temple and signs of strangulation. F. 5, court dossier, quotation 2.
136/ Manuel de Jesús Franco Ramírez, age 35, a graduate in international relations and a member of the Partido Unión Democrática Nacionalista (UDN). There were four bullet wounds in his thorax and signs of strangulation. F. 6, court dossier, quotation 2.
137/ Humberto Mendoza, age 30, a member of the Movimiento de Liberación Popular (MLP). There were two bullet wounds in his body, one in the temple and the other in the thorax, and signs of strangulation. F. 4 court dossier, quotation 2.
138/ Doroteo Hernández, journalist and trade union leader of the Unión de Pobladores de Tugurios (UPT). At the time, he was not identified as a leader of FDR; however, the UCA Human Rights Institute/Christian Legal Aid document sent to the Commission on the Truth states that he was a leader of that organization.
139/ The Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR) came into being on 18 April 1980 as a result of a political agreement between the Frente Democrático (FD) and the Coordinadora Revolucionaria de Masas (CRM). It was formally established on 18 April 1980 by various political, popular and mass organizations. A number of its leaders had held prominent government posts in the first Revolutionary Junta which had overthrown General Romero on 15 October 1979. At the time, the leadership of FDR consisted of the five victims, Leoncio Pichinte and Juan José Martel.
140/ The National University of El Salvador was militarized on 26 June 1980, along with the Western University Centre and the Eastern University Centre, Revista ECA, No. 389, March 1981, p. 240. Other human rights organizations were also persecuted.
141/ "G3" rifles were the regulation weapon of the security forces at the time and were used by the armed forces of El Salvador in the war against Honduras in 1969.
142/ The JRG communiqué speaks of 13, a UPI cable mentions 200, Prensa Gráfica, 28 November 1980.
143/ The dossier notes that the justice of the peace made a visual inspection, that the bodies were identified and that two death certificates were issued. There was no police report of any kind, and nothing at all was done by the judicial authorities; the case was finally closed because no proceedings had been carried out during a given period of time. This case clearly demonstrates the failure of the judiciary to function.
144/ Major Roberto D’Aubuisson stated publicly in a communiqué "Right now, based on the information available to us, we attribute responsibility to DRU, acting on direct orders from Colonel Majano ...".
145/ Communiqués of the Brigada Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, the Revolutionary Government Junta, the armed forces, Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, FDR, FMLN, Revista ECA No. 386, December 1980.
146/ Another significant point is that neither President Duarte nor other important Christian Democratic leaders were in the country, nor was Colonel Majano.
147/ Letter dated 9 December 1992 from the Commission on the Truth to the Chief of the National Police.
148/ The funeral itself turned into another act of violence when an explosive device blew up.